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Introduction 
DIANAWOODWARD 
[EDITOR’SNOTE:since Diana Woodward was unable to write her 
introduction to this issue, the journal editor decided to form a brief 
introduction from a portion of the paper Professor Woodward 
presented at a symposium at Rutgers in 1989 and from the “nutshell” 
she was able to complete. The following introductory commentary 
was prepared by Jana Varlejs of the Rutgers School of 
Communication, Information and Library Studies.] 
How might a philosopher reason about intellectual freedom? 
This is the question Diana Woodward would have addressed in her 
introduction to this issue of Library Trends. She had planned to 
rework a paper which she delivered at Rutgers in 1989 for a symposium 
on ethics in the information professions. In that paper, she described 
several approaches to ethical reasoning, and concluded with a 
dlscussion of how one could apply two kinds of arguments in a defense 
of intellectual freedom. The full text of the paper is published 
elsewhere (Woodward, forthcoming), and should be read by those 
interested in understanding the broader context of Dr. Woodward’s 
thinking about intellectual freedom. She noted the fact that most 
people have not thought through the principles upon which they 
base actions and make choices. Too many, she seemed to feel, were 
content to respond to a moral or ethical issue on the basis of feeling, 
rather than reason. 
Her concern was not so much with making an elegant case for 
the defense of intellectual freedom, but rather with demonstrating 
that one could apply methods of ethical reasoning to intellectual 
freedom issues. The principle that Diana Woodward adhered to was 
that clear and logical thought must underlie the behavior of 
professionals who purport to have a sense of ethics in regard to their 
practice. She ended her Rutgers presentation by taking her audience 
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through two types of ethical arguments-the consequentialist and 
deon tological-only to conclude that she had reached a “beginning, 
not an end, of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual 
freedom.” Tragically, she was not able to carry the investigation 
forward, for she was grappling with a fundamental issue of concern 
to the library/information profession, and had much to teach us. 
The following is an excerpt from Dr. Woodward’s paper, which she 
planned to rewrite and elaborate on for this issue. 
-Jana Varlejs 
As a case study in reasoning about information ethics, consider 
how one might defend intellectual freedom. One can give both 
consequen tialist and deon tological arguments for intellectual 
freedom, but the choice of an ethical theory upon which intellectual 
freedom is based can result in different decisions about what ought 
to be done in particular cases. 
The term intellectual freedom, broadly construed, includes both 
the right to the intellectual efforts of others and a right to distribute 
one’s own intellectual efforts. These efforts include written works, 
conversation, speeches, and various art forms (e.g., dance or sculpture) 
that can be used to communicate ideas. 
To defend intellectual freedom on consequentialist grounds, one 
must make the case that i t  is best for someone (me, everyone except 
me, or all concerned) if information is broadly disseminated. The 
best known consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom comes 
from John Stuart Mill (1951)who made his defense from the negative 
side-i.e., restricting intellectual freedom is harmful. He argued that 
if we suppress ideas we may be suppressing the truth. Even if the 
ideas we suppress are not the truth, there may be some germ of truth 
in them or something that gives insights into new truths. 
Furthermore, even if the promoted opinion is the truth and suppressed 
views are completely false, people will not have as much faith and 
commitment to the promoted opinion if they do not see i t  openly 
debated and defended in contest with other views. For all these reasons, 
intellectual freedom is needed to make certain the truth is both 
discovered and believed. 
The assumption behind this reasoning is that people are better 
off if the truth is known. Not everyone agrees with this. The whole 
point of paternalistic censorship (whether i t  be censorship of 
pornographic or racist material in the United States or censorship 
of political news in the Soviet Union), is that i t  is better for society 
in general and often better for individuals themselves if they are not 
exposed to certain sorts of ideas, even if there is some truth to those 
ideas. The consequentialist defense of intellectual freedom then 
depends upon first establishing whether or not people are better off 
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when they are exposed to all intellectual efforts. The typical result 
is that one starts dividing up intellectual efforts into those that are 
good for people and those that are not. Defending the distribution 
of the former only is not defending intellectual freedom in principle. 
To defend intellectual freedom in principle, and not merely in 
those cases where it can be shown to be of benefit to someone, one 
needs to provide a deontological defense of intellectual freedom. One 
method of providing such a defense involves deriving the right to 
information from the nature of man. Another method involves 
demonstrating that one could not consistently will that information 
be withheld from people. 
It would be inconsistent to will that the truth be withheld from 
people. If the truth were withheld from everyone, including you, 
then you would not have enough evidence to decide what are the 
truths that are to be withheld. Withholding all information, not 
merely the truth, does not lead to inconsistency. There does, however, 
seem to be some silliness in the suggestion that we might adopt 
the maxim: Withhold all information from everyone. Adopting the 
maxim: Withhold harmful information sounds more like a maxim 
that a censor might wish to act upon. While I cannot demonstrate 
that there is any inconsistency involved in adopting such a maxim, 
I would like to point out that i t  returns us to consequentialist 
reasoning as we must determine what information has harmful 
consequences. The defender of intellectual freedom can reply that 
one can consistently act upon the maxim: Withhold no information. 
To adopt this maxim is to refuse to censor information even when 
that information is regarded as harmful. To adopt this maxim is 
to say that no one needs to justify his or her request for information 
on any consequentialist grounds. Thus this is a “safer” ethical theory 
for defending intellectual freedom than is consequentialism. 
One can obtain similar results if one provides a deontological 
defense of intellectual freedom based not on Kantian criteria for a 
maxim, but on rights derived from the nature of man. Assuming 
for the sake of argument that man’s nature (or essence) is his 
rationality, one may argue that any attempt to limit man’s ability 
to reason is an attack on man’s very nature, his primary mode of 
survival. Next, one argues that limiting man’s access to the ideas 
of others would limit man’s ability to reason. The conclusion is that 
limitations on intellectual freedom are attacks on man himself. By 
this reasoning, all people have a right to all information regardless 
of whether or not that information might be harmful to them. Again, 
one need not justify any request €orinformation on consequentialist 
grounds. Thus this deontological defense of intellectual freedom is 
also a “safer” defense than consequentialist defenses. 
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A “safer” defense is one that admits of fewer exceptions to the 
principle being advocated. To say that deontological defenses of 
intellectual freedom are “safer” is not to say that they are more 
ethically valid. Perhaps, as consequentialist ethics allows, there 
should be limits to intellectual freedom based on consequences. To 
say that deontological defenses of intellectual freedom are safer is 
not to say that they admit of no circumstance in which censorship 
is justified. It is possible that the maxim: withhold no information 
may conflict with another maxim, such as those protecting personal 
privacy or those protecting private property. As was stated earlier, 
establishing a deontological right to information is the beginning, 
not the end, of an ethical investigation concerning intellectual 
freedom. 
THEPROBLEMIN A NUTSHELL-PATERNALISTIC 
CENSORSHIP PROTECTIONAND PRIVACY 
If intellectual freedom is understood as the right both to 
disseminate one’s own views and to obtain access to the views of 
others, then censorship is one (of several) activities that may conflict 
with intellectual freedom. When people have strong negative 
reactions to censorship, often it is because they are identifying 
censorship with those cases designed to hide crime or to increase 
the power of someone “underserving.” By controlling information, 
one may get away with treason, extortion, even murder. But these 
cases of censorship do not provide ethical dilemmas. The censorship 
is as wrong as the activities it is hiding. 
Censorship becomes an ethical issue when there is some “good” 
reason for censoring that is set in opposition to a “good” reason 
for not censoring. As noted in the introduction to this series of articles, 
the value of intellectual freedom is always a “good” reason for not 
censoring or otherwise restricting the flow of information. Two 
conflicts that arise are between intellectual freedom and the right 
to information and between intellectual freedom and paternalistic 
censorship. 
Paternalistic censorship is the censoring of information for the 
sake of the public (as opposed to the sake of the censorer). If one 
believes i t  is bad for society if children grow up reading books that 
portray women or blacks in subservient roles, then one may be 
inclined to limit children’s access to such reading material. This is 
paternalistic censorship. If one believes that certain news stories will 
merely make people feel frustrated and fearful, avoiding printing 
those stories for that reason is paternalistic censorship. The difficulty 
about paternalistic censorship is that i t  is applicable if and when 
one is one’s brother’s keeper. This is clearly appropriate if the brother 
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is a child. Children need guidance in many matters including what 
they should read at what age. But for those who believe that adults 
should have autonomy to read whatever they wish (even if i t  makes 
them sad or perverted), the difficulty is determining at what age 
different sorts of reading material might be no longer censored- 
at what point is society no longer its brother’s keeper with regard 
to what material is read. 
There is a long history to paternalistic censorship, much of which 
has been misunderstood. Our image of the Spanish Inquisition tends 
to be of evil men censoring the beliefs of others even to the point 
of tormenting or even killing those whose beliefs could not be 
changed. This is not likely to be the way in which they saw themselves. 
If there was no smallpox vaccine, then we would try to keep those 
infected away from the rest of society because of the physical damage 
it would do to others if they were exposed to the pox. We would 
attempt to cure them (if possible), if that failed we would attempt 
to isolate them, and if that failed we would kill them to keep them 
away from ourselves and friends. We would do all this to protect 
ourselves from physical harm. How much more important it would 
be to keep society from the spiritual harm that could damage one 
for all eternity. The Inquisitors attempted to cure the disbelievers, 
if that failed, to isolate them, and if that failed, to kill them before 
they could infect good people. The attempt to cure dissenters from 
their beliefs was seen as to the dissenters’ advantage as well as to 
that of society. The remainder was to society’s advantage. But even 
this paragon of evil censorship, the Spanish Inquisitor, can be 
understood as doing his work not out of meanness, but out of concern 
for society. He was his brother’s keeper to both the dissident and 
the innocent. 
The ethical problem lies not so much with the Inquisitor’s motive, 
as with the information on which he based his reasoning. We no 
longer agree that one is likely to spend eternity damned if one is 
exposed to the beliefs of dissenters. For one thing, many people do 
not believe they will spend eternity damned regardless of what beliefs 
they hold. Furthermore, even if holding some beliefs could lead to 
damnation, mere exposure to those beliefs may do more to innoculate 
one against them than to cause one to succumb to them. 
Finally, i t  may be that the interesting question for salvation versus 
damnation is not what one does believe, but what one would have 
believed if subjected to certain dissenter opinions. In this last case, 
our brother’s keeper cannot help us by governing what we are exposed 
to, but only by helping us understand and evaluate the material to 
which we might be exposed. In this last analysis, not only the 
Inquisitor, but also any paternalistic censor has the job of helping 
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the public analyze and evaluate potentially harmful materials so that 
exposure to them is innoculating and not disease-producing. The 
difficulty is in determining for what sorts of people at what ages 
this process is possible (assuming that for those sufficiently young, 
emotionally disturbed, or men tally retarded the analyze-and-evaluate 
techniques will not work). The problem for the paternalistic censor 
is to determine for what people (if any) which materials (if any) 
should be withheld (by whom) and with what justifications and 
procedures to ensure that only these materials are withheld from only 
these people. 
The other area where the value of intellectual freedom comes 
into conflict with other ethical values is in the area of privacy 
protection. When something I want to read is something you want 
kept private, then a conflict has arisen. These conflicts can be very 
difficult to sort out in part because it  is difficult to say what material 
should receive privacy protection in what circumstances. 
Together these two ethical concerns, intellectual freedom versus 
privacy protection and versus paternalistic censorship, make up  the 
first section of this Library Trends. 
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